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A STRUCTURAL DISANALOGY BETWEEN AESTHETIC AND ETHICAL VALUE JUDGMENTS
Caj Strandberg

It is often suggested that aesthetic and ethical value judgments are similar in such a way that they should be analyzed in analogous manners. In this paper, I argue that the two types of judgments share four important features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. This, I maintain, helps to explain why many philosophers have thought that aesthetic and ethical value judgments can be analyzed in accordance with the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the analogy between secondary qualities and values. However, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgments differ as regards their fundamental structures. This scheme is mistaken as regards ethical value judgments, but it is able to account for aesthetic value judgments. This implies that aesthetic value judgments are autonomous in relation to ethical value judgments and that aestheticians, not moral philosophers, are the true heirs of this renowned analogy.

1. INTRODUCTION
When we try to illuminate an area which is thought to be philosophically problematic, we often compare it with another area which is assumed to resemble it. At times such comparisons are straightforward. An area which is held to be less problematic casts light on some of the contested issues and, as a result, our understanding is increased. However, sometimes the comparisons are more difficult to carry out and, as a consequence, the results more doubtful. In particular, we run the risk of overstating the similarities between the areas in question and as a result end up with having faulty conceptions of one or both of them.   
	This, I will argue, is precisely what is the case with the notorious comparison between aesthetic and ethical value judgments. It is regularly suggested, in aesthetics as well as ethics, that judgments such as ‘It was right of him to give the money back’ and ‘Moby Dick is a great work of art’, are similar, both in the sense that they have the same basic structure and in the sense of having the same degree of ‘objectivity’ or ‘subjectivity’.​[1]​
	In this paper, I will argue that, although there are important similarities between aesthetic and ethical value judgments, there is a fundamental difference between them: They differ as regards their very structures. As a consequence, when we look for analogous analyses of aesthetic and ethical values judgments, we end up with erroneous analyses of either or both kind of judgments. In the next section, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgments seem to share four essential features concerning disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. In section 3, I suggest that these features have led philosophers to conclude that they should be analyzed in terms of the same dispositional scheme which corresponds to the well-known analogy between secondary qualities and values. This scheme, it appears, can explain both the ‘subjective’ features of value judgments—disagreement and motivation—and their ‘objective’ features—categoricity and argumentation. In Section 4, I argue that aesthetic and ethical value judgments have entirely different structures. As a consequence, the mentioned dispositional scheme cannot account for ethical value judgments, but I argue that it is able to account for their aesthetic counterparts. Moreover, I suggest another dispositional scheme which can account for ethical value judgments. In the final section, I conclude that aesthetic value judgments are autonomous in relation to ethical value judgments and that aestheticians, not moral philosophers, are the true heir of the famous analogy with secondary qualities. 

2. AESTHETIC AND ETHICAL VALUE JUDGMENTS: FOR COMMON FEATURES
Why have philosophers been inclined to think that aesthetic and ethical value judgments can be analyzed in analogous manners? The main reason, I think, is that they have sensed that the two kinds of judgments have certain essential features in common and that the same type of analysis therefore should apply to them.​[2]​
	Let us start by noticing that both aesthetic and ethical value judgments seem to have two ‘subjective’ features in common. 	
	(i) Disagreement. It is frequently observed that we seem to disagree as regards our value judgments to a higher degree than what is the case as regards other, non-evaluative, judgments we make. Accordingly, the variance concerning ethical and aesthetic value judgments appears more extensive in comparison with other seemingly fact-stating judgments, even if the extension of disagreement is disputed.
	(ii) Motivation. In moral philosophy, it is standardly claimed that there is a close connection between a certain kind of ethical value judgments and motivation which is essential for our understanding of the nature of these judgments. Thus, we assume that if a person recognizes that it is morally right that he performs an action, he is motivated to perform the action, given that he fulfils certain adequate conditions on moral agency.​[3]​ Consequently, if the person is not motivated in this manner, we require an explanation. As this formulation suggests, a plausible explanation might be that the person suffers from depression or some other mental condition which impede on his moral agency. 
Interestingly, although it seldom is explicitly pointed out, a related connection seems to hold between a certain kind of aesthetic value judgments and motivation. Thus, we assume that if a person recognizes that a work of art is aesthetically good, he is motivated to experience works which might provide him with a similar sensation, given that he fulfils certain adequate conditions on aesthetic competence. For example, if someone recognizes the great aesthetic value of Guernica, we expect that he will be motivated to see the picture again or explore other pictures that might give him a similar sensation. This claim is essential to aesthetics as it concerns the notion that there is a significant connection between our aesthetic value judgments and our motivation to seek works of art that can provide us with rewarding aesthetic experiences. Moreover, it helps to account for the importance of aesthetic value judgments and why aesthetic education regularly is successful. Consequently, if someone is not motivated in mentioned manner, we look for an explanation.​[4]​ As indicated by the formulation above, one explanation might be that the person lacks in aesthetic competence, such as insufficient aesthetic sensibility or knowledge of the art form in question. 
However, the connection we assume to hold between ethical value judgments and motivation seems closer than the corresponding connection between aesthetic value judgments and motivation.​[5]​ It is not difficult to imagine a person who recognizes that a work of art is aesthetically good, but is not motivated to look out for similar works, since he has become tired of the kind of sensation they give him, or for some other reason. As regards ethical value judgments, a corresponding case would appear more startling and in need of a less frivolous explanation.
	It might be argued that features (i) and (ii) can be explained by an expressivist analysis of value judgments. On this view, value judgments express non-cognitive attitudes, with the consequence that such judgments cannot be true or false, at least not in the same way as ordinary fact-stating judgments.​[6]​ Expressivists can explain (i) by maintaining that our value judgments conflict with each other to a large extent because they express non-cognitive attitudes of individuals who differ in a number of respects. They can consequently argue that since non-cognitive attitudes are idiosyncratic, varying from person to person, and culture-dependent, we disagree to a considerable extent in our aesthetic value judgments. A similar suggestion can be made as regards ethical value judgments. Expressivists can explain (ii) by referring to the fact non-cognitive attitudes are motivating. Aesthetic value judgments express non-cognitive attitudes towards works of art where such attitudes motivate in the manner mentioned above. Again, a similar explanation is available concerning ethical value judgments. 
	However, value judgments also seem to have features which are ‘objective’, which indicate that expressivism might not be able to explain this complex phenomenon.
	(iii) Categoricity. It is frequently observed in moral philosophy that ethical value judgments seem to apply to actions independently of our attitudes towards them. In other words, such judgments seem categorical: The correctness of a judgment to the effect that an action is morally right for a person to perform is not conditional on whether he actually wants to perform it or not. It seems plausible to think that something of this kind also holds true of aesthetic value judgments. Most of us would accept that it is incorrect to assert, for instance, that Beethoven’s third symphony is a bad piece of music or that Guernica is a really lousy painting, and that this is incorrect quite irrespective of what a single individual experiences when he listens to the music and looks at the picture. It is not essential to my point that we agree about the value of these particular works of art or any other. What is essential is that aesthetic value judgments are categorical in the following sense: The correctness of a judgment to the effect that an art of work is aesthetically good is not conditional on whether a particular person actually has a certain response towards it or not. In other words, there is at least a logical possibility for mistake: A person’s aesthetic value judgment about a certain work of art can be incorrect irrespectively of how he in fact responds to it. 
	(iv) Argumentation. Another essential feature of value judgments is that it seems possible to argue about them in a rational manner, which suggests that our aesthetic and ethical value judgments do not merely concern our own subjective responses, since that would make such debates pointless. As regards aesthetic value judgments, we argue by referring to properties of works of art that are thought to make them good or bad.​[7]​ A corresponding claim holds as regards ethical value judgments. 
	Whereas features (i) and (ii) direct us towards ‘subjective’ analyses of aesthetic and ethical value judgments, features (iii) and (iv) point in an ‘objective’ direction. In view of the fact that all these four features seem to be part of our conception of value judgments, we appear to have reached a kind of paradox: such judgments are both subjective and objective.

3. OBSERVERS IN AESTHETICS AND ETHICS
It is reasonable to assume that philosophers who have attempted to dissolve the paradoxical nature of value judgments have been led, explicitly or implicitly, to analyze them in dispositional terms. More precisely, it seems that it has made them adopt analyses which instantiate the following well-known dispositional scheme:

Dispositional Structure of Value Judgments 1 (DS1): Necessarily, for any object x, x has value V if and only if x has properties B such that x would elicit response R in person P in conditions C.

It is important to point out that DS1 describes a scheme of analyses, where the different parts can be specified in numerous ways, which means that DS1 can be instantiated by a number of widely different analyses. In particular, there are both reductionist and non-reductionist versions of DS1. According to a reductionist version of DS1, none of the parts of the analysis (B, R, P, or C) has to make reference, explicitly or implicitly, to V in order for the analysis to be true. According to a non-reductionist version of DS1, at least one of these parts has to make explicit or implicit reference to V in order for the analysis to be true. My arguments above will be neutral vis-à-vis reductionist or non-reductionist versions of DS1. The same holds for what I say about DS2 in the next section.​[8]​ 
The fact that DS1 and DS2 are compatible with non-reductionist views of value judgments is important for two reasons. First, it means that they are compatible with a version of realism according to which value judgments can be true or false and are impossible to reduce to facts about people’s actual evaluations.​[9]​ Second, it implies that DS1 and DS2 are available to many different positions in aesthetics and ethics. It is often presumed that analyses which instantiate DS1 or DS2 are proposed by aesthetics or ethicists who are reductionists. However, as there are non-reductionist versions of these schemes, they can be employed by philosophers who are not sympathetic to such projects but who nonetheless want to characterize the structure of value judgments. Although such an analysis would not be reductive, it might be informative as it can say something essential about the various notions that are entailed by a certain kind of value judgment, as well as the relation between these notions.
Analyses of aesthetic value judgments which instantiate DS1 represent the following structure:​[10]​ A work of art  x (e.g. a painting or a literary or musical work) is V (e.g. is aesthetically good) if and only if x has certain properties B (e.g. aesthetic properties) which would elicit a certain aesthetic response R (e.g. a fulfilling aesthetic experience) in a person P, an ideal aesthetic observer, where the characteristics of such a person can be spelled out in different manners (e.g. perfect aesthetic sensibility, historical and technical knowledge of the form of art in question) in C (e.g. normal light conditions, an acceptable translation or performance). As the relevant response R is had by a person P who experiences x, P can be regarded as an observer of x.
	It might be argued that such an analysis is able to explain both the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ features of aesthetic value judgments so as to dissolve the tensions between (i)–(ii) and (iii)–(iv). (i) We disagree in our aesthetic value judgments because we are not all Ps. For instance, we are not all equally sensitive to B, such as the aesthetic properties of works of art and, as a consequence, we come up with competing evaluations.​[11]​ Alternatively, some of us do not experience x in C, with the same consequence. (ii) Assume that P, an ideal aesthetic observer, recognizes that x has V and that P is motivated to experience works that can give him a similar sensation as x. This can be explained thus: x has B which elicits a fulfilling aesthetic response R in P and, as a result, P is motivated to look out for works that might give him a similar sensation as x.​[12]​ We are consequently motivated in this manner to the extent we approximate the characteristics of P. (iii) It is a response R had by Ps, elicited by B in C, which verifies that a work of art is aesthetically good. As a consequence, aesthetic value judgments are categorical in the sense that whether a work of art is aesthetically good is not conditional on a person’s subjective response. (iv) It is possible to argue about the value of x because we can argue whether x really is such that it elicits R in P in C, i.e. we can argue whether x really has B. Alternatively, we may argue whether some of us actually satisfy the demands on a P, or whether C really is the case. 
	Analyses of ethical value judgments which instantiate DS1 represent the following structure: An action x is V (e.g. morally right) if and only if x has non-moral properties B which would elicit​[13]​ an ethically relevant response R (e.g. approval) in P, an ideal ethical observer (e.g. a fully informed, rational, benevolent, and impartial person), in certain conditions C.​[14]​  Again, since the relevant response R is had by a person P who experiences or thinks about x, P can be regarded as an observer of x.
	It might be thought that such an analysis can explain features (i)–(iv). (i) Disagreement about ethical value judgments can be explained by referring to P (or C). Only a person who is a P is guaranteed to discover the morally relevant properties B in actions and since we are not all Ps, we disagree. (ii) Ethical value judgments can be said to be motivating since R, the response of approval had by P (an ideal ethical observer), because x has B, is motivating. If a person approves of an action, he is motivated to perform it, or to contribute to the performance of it, given that he fulfils the conditions stated in P (and is situated in C). We are accordingly motivated to the extent we approximate the characteristics of P. (iii) The categorical and non-relative character of ethical value judgments are explained by the fact that these judgments implicitly refer to R and P; not all responses of all persons are adequate and only responses R of Ps are guaranteed to be so. Whether an action is V is thus not determined by what people actually want to do. (iv) Argumentation concerning moral matters might be explained by our questioning whether x actually has B or whether some of us really fulfil the demands on a P.

4. AESTHETICS AND ETHICAL VALUE JUDGMENTS: DIFFERENT STRUCTURES
In what follows, I will argue that analyses which are modelled on DS1 fail to account for ethical value judgments since they misconstrue the relevant aspect of (ii): moral motivation. In order to account for this aspect, we need another dispositional structure (DS2). We will then see, however, that analyses that are modelled on DS1 are able to account for aesthetic value judgments, including the relevant aspect of (ii): aesthetic motivation.​[15]​ 
	We observed above that it is plausible to assume that if a person recognizes that it is morally right that he performs an action, he is motivated to perform the action, granted that he satisfies certain adequate conditions on moral agency. Let us now ask: What happens when a person becomes motivated in that manner? A plausible description seems to be that the person experiences, or thinks, of a certain situation, for example that a child is left alone crying. The properties of this situation then makes him have a certain motivational state, given that he fulfils adequate conditions on moral agency, such that he is motivated to perform a certain action, for example tries to console the child and find its parents.​[16]​ He might also become aware that the action in question is morally right for him perform. What seems to be essential with ethics in relation to motivation is that of certain situations making demands on agents, and agents responding to these demands with motivation to perform the required actions. In view of the fact that motivation has the important role in relation to ethical value judgments which is evinced by feature (ii), an analysis of such judgments should be able to account for this basic picture. 
	There are three fundamental reasons, as I see it, as to why analyses of ethical value judgments that instantiate DS1 cannot do justice to moral motivation.
	(1) Wrong object. According to DS1, what elicits a motivating response, in the form of approval, in an ideal ethical observer is an action which has a certain moral property. Thus, what elicits the motivating response on this view is the very entity which has the value property in question, what I henceforth will refer to as an object of evaluation. However, an action seems to be unsatisfactory as a source of the motivating response according to the picture of moral motivation above. Intuitively, what make ethical demands on us are not actions which have moral properties, but rather situations which might lack moral properties altogether. In other words, what elicits the relevant motivating response is not an object of evaluation, but a situation which is quite distinct from it. What have the relevant moral properties are in turn the actions that are results of appropriate motivating responses to such situations.​[17]​ 
	 (2) Wrong subject. According to DS1, the person who responds with having a motivating response, in the form of approval, is an ideal ethical observer, a person experiencing or thinking about an action which is morally right. However, in the basic picture of moral motivation suggested above it is elementary that the motivating response is had by a person who performs, or will perform, an action which is right: a moral agent. In other words, DS1 seems to go astray by assigning the motivating response, not to the person involved in a morally demanding situation, an agent, but to a person who is observing an action which is the result of the agent’s confrontation with the situation, an observer.
	(3) Insufficient connection. According to DS1, it is an ideal ethical observer who has a motivating response towards an action. This means that such analyses merely can explain that there is a close connection between ethical value judgments and motivation in ideal ethical observers. However, the connection seems much more general that this view suggests. We expect that any person who recognizes that an action is morally right is accordingly motivated granted that he satisfies certain adequate conditions. In particular, we expect this connection to occur not only in ideal ethical observers, i.e. persons who observe actions with moral properties, but in every person who fulfils adequate constraints on moral agency.  
	It might be responded that DS1 can explain the motivation of moral agents even though it does not explicitly refer to agents who are motivated to act by having motivating responses elicited by situations. 
According to one version of this defence, it is possible to explain an agent’s motivation to perform a moral action by maintaining that he wants to cause approval in an ideal ethical observer.​[18]​ However, this view is flawed since agents do not standardly act morally with the motive to elicit approval in an imagined ideal ethical observer. 
According to another version of this defence, moral agents have the motive to please an ideal ethical observer because such an observer approves of actions that are right. Moral agents are on this view indirectly motivated to please the observer because they are directly motivated to do what is right. This suggestion is problematic for at least two reasons. First, even if the motive to do what is right sometimes is what motivates moral agents, this is not always the case; all motivating moral reasons of moral agents do not refer to moral properties.​[19]​ Second, this suggestion separates the motives of moral agents from what an ideal observer approves of. On this suggestion, a moral agent is motivated to perform actions because they are right. However, according to DS1 an ideal ethical observer does not typically approve of actions because they are right, but because they have certain non-moral properties. This means that the motive moral agents have to perform the relevant actions does not correspond with an ideal ethical observer’s reason for approval of these actions.  
	It might be replied that even if moral agents are not motivated to elicit approval in an ideal ethical observer because they want to do what is right, the motives of agents who act rightly and the observer’s response of approval are correlated. An agent who acts rightly acts on motives that are morally legitimate to act on, and an ideal ethical observer approves of the actions such an agent performs because of the non-moral properties of these actions. It might be thought that this view avoids the difficulties noted above: An ideal ethical observer does not approve of actions because they are right, but because they have certain non-moral properties. Moreover, since a moral agent is motivated to perform actions that have non-moral properties which elicit approval in an ideal ethical observer, the agent’s motives and the observer’s response are correlated. However, the basic problem is that advocates of DS1 does not confirm to the intuitive picture above of what motivates moral agents. The only thing they can say in this regard is that the motives of moral agents are correlated with the approvals of an ideal ethical observer, and the only explanation of why the motives are had by such agents is that the resulting actions are approved of by such an observer. DS1 does not contain any reference to a situation an agent responds to, or to the fact that an agent has a motivating attitude in relation to an action because he recognizes that the situation in question has certain non-moral properties.	
	It might be thought that there is a more radical way of replying to these objections. According to this proposal, an ideal ethical observer should not be thought of as separate from a moral agent. In particular, one should think of an ideal ethical observer as an ethically perfected version of oneself, as one would be if one undergoes some adequate improvements on one’s moral agency. As a result, it might be thought that DS1 avoids the objections above since the distinction between observer and agent dissolves. However, this proposal has a problem which is similar to one noticed above: It seems implausible that a moral agent should be motivated to act rightly because he wants to cause approval in a morally perfected version of himself. 
However, this proposal has the advantage of suggesting a solution to the problems observed above. To say that an action which it is right for a certain person to perform is an action which an ethically perfected version of himself would approve of, comes close to saying that an action is right for him to perform in so far as he would want to perform it if he were perfected in certain ethically relevant ways. The actions that such an ‘observer’ would approve of are such that he would want to perform them. In case he would not want to perform them himself (were he in the same situation), we would presumably not view him as ethically perfected.​[20]​ Correspondingly, the actions an ethically perfected person would want to perform are such that he would approve of them. However, this does not entail that an ethically perfected person has the motive to perform actions because he, as ethically perfected, would approve of them. 
	Thus, if an ethically perfected person approves of an action, he would be motivated to perform it, and, vice versa, an ethically perfected person is motivated to do what would elicit approval in him. But this should not make us conclude that he is motivated to elicit approval in an ethically ideal version of himself. Rather, this view leaves open for the possibility that his motivation is a response to the non-moral properties of the situation he confronts. 
	This line of thought suggests that there is a dispositional scheme suitable for analyses of ethical value judgments which is able to explain features (i)–(iv) but which at the same time avoids the difficulties of DS1: An action x is V (e.g. morally right) if and only if a situation S has certain non-moral properties B which would elicit a motivating response R in relation to x in S (e.g. motivation to perform x in S, or motivation to contribute to the performance of x in S) in a person P, an ideal moral agent.​[21]​  
This proposal is dispositional but entirely different from DSI, since it makes reference to a situation which elicits a motivating response towards an action in an ethically perfected person who is a moral agent, not to an action eliciting a response towards itself in an ideal ethical observer. 
Analyses of this type would be instances of the following dispositional scheme:
 
Dispositional Structure of Value Judgments 2 (DS2): Necessarily, for any x, x has value V if and only if a situation S has characteristics B such that S would elicit response R towards x in person P in S.

Like DS1, DS2 is compatible with a number of different interpretations of its various parts (S, B, R, P) and thus compatible with a number of different analyses. The resulting analysis is reductionist or non-reductionist depending on whether it can be true without any of the parts of the analysis making reference to V. Accordingly, DS2 is compatible with realism about value judgments.
In view of the fact that B is constituted by properties of S (a situation), not by properties of x (the object of evaluation), DS2 escapes objection (1) against DS1 as an analysis of ethical value judgments, namely that it implies that the motivating response (R) is directed towards wrong object. Likewise, since P is, not an ideal ethical observer, but an ideal moral agent who responds towards a situation S, DS2 also escapes objection (2), namely that the motivating response (R) is had by wrong subject. Moreover, since P is an ideal moral agent, rather than an ideal ethical observer, there is hope that DS2 can account for the close connection between people’s ethical value judgments and their motivation, provided that they meet adequate conditions on moral agency and thereby approximates the characteristics of an ideal moral agent. Thus, it has at least a chance to avoid objection (3). However, DS2 is in need of further discussion.​[22]​ 
	There are also reasons to think that an analysis of ethical value judgments which is modelled on DS2 might be able to explain features (i)–(iv). (i) We disagree about ethical value judgments because we are not equally sensitive to the morally relevant non-moral properties of S; we are not all Ps. (ii) Ethical value judgments are closely connected to motivation by referring to a motivating response R which represents a motivating attitude we would have if we were Ps, ideal moral agents. We are accordingly motivated to the extent we approximate the characteristics of P. According to this view, motivation does not have to go roundabout ways; ethical value judgments make reference to a motivating response of an ideal moral agent who faces a moral requirement in situation S (or an ideal moral person who advices a less idealized person about what to do in S). (iii) Ethical value judgments might be categorical; what is right does not depend on what we actually want; it rather depends on what we would want if we had been Ps. (iv) We can argue as to whether x really has B, or as to whether some of us do not fulfil the demands put on a P.​[23]​
	Now, what is especially important in the present inquiry is the following: The arguments directed against DS1 as a scheme for analyses of ethical value judgments cannot be directed against it as a scheme for analyses of aesthetic value judgments. Indeed, whereas DS1 is unable to describe the structure of ethical value judgments, it seems able to explain the structure of aesthetic value judgments.​[24]​ In particular, it seems apt to account for the relevant notion of aesthetic motivation.
	We saw earlier that if a person recognizes that a work of art is aesthetically good, we are inclined to assume that he is motivated to experience works that might give him a similar sensation, granted that he meets certain adequate conditions on aesthetic competence. Let us now ask: What happens when a person becomes motivated in this manner? A plausible answer seems to be that he experiences a certain work of art which is aesthetically good, that it provides him with a fulfilling aesthetic experience of some kind, and that he, as a result, becomes motivated to experience works which can provide him with a similar sensation. At least, we expect that he is motivated in this manner given that we take him to satisfy certain conditions on aesthetic competence. Two aspects of this intuitively plausible account should be stressed. First, what provide the relevant explanation of the person’s aesthetic motivation are properties of the work of art itself: the object of evaluation. In other words, it is the artwork which is aesthetically good which is such, has properties such, that it elicits a fulfilling aesthetic sensation in him which in turn makes him motivated to look out for works that can give him a similar sensation. (Typically, these properties consist in aesthetic properties.) Second, the motivation is had by an aesthetic observer since it is had by a person who experiences the work of art in question. 
We can now see that, when applied to aesthetic value judgments, DS1 does not have the difficulties we noticed above as regards ethical value judgments. 
(1) Right object. We observed in section 3 that DS1 explains the relevant notion of aesthetic motivation in the following manner: A work of art which is aesthetically good elicits a fulfilling aesthetic experience in an ideal observer. As a result, he becomes motivated to look out for works which might give him a similar sensation. Importantly, on DS1 the relevant explanation of his motivation is to be found in properties of the work itself: It is properties of the work which elicits the fulfilling aesthetic experience which in turn explains that he becomes motivated to look out for similar works. Moreover, those who are not aesthetically ideal observers are motivated in that manner in so far as they fulfil adequate conditions on aesthetic competence and thereby approximate the characteristics of such an observer. This means that DS1 corresponds to the plausible picture of aesthetic motivation just outlined: The relevant explanation of why an aesthetically competent person who recognizes that a work of art is aesthetically good becomes motivated to experience works which might give him a similar sensation is to be found in work of art itself. In particular, it is properties of the work which provide the relevant explanation of his fulfilling experience which in turns makes him motivated to experience similar works.
In short, the central contrast between aesthetic and ethical value judgments in the present regard is the following: An aesthetic observer who responds by having the relevant motivating state responds to what has the value property in question: the object of evaluation. A moral agent who responds by having the relevant motivating state does not respond to what has the value property in question, the object of evaluation, but to a situation which calls for action, which in turn has a moral property. This vital difference between ethics and aesthetics is, as we have seen, reflected in the different structures of DS1 and DS2.
This account is compatible with there being various significant connections of other kinds between aesthetic appreciations and motivational states than those I have discussed.​[25]​ Most importantly, it is compatible with the fact that what elicits a motivating response need not be an object in any restricted sense. Above all, it need not be a work of art. For example, the fact that flowers in a vase are placed randomly might motivate an individual to rearrange them. What it essential to the present view is not that what elicits the relevant motivating response is an object, or a work of art, but that what elicits such a response is an entity which has the aesthetic value in question, what I have referred to as an object of evaluation. Thus, it seems plausible to argue that the fact that the flowers are put randomly involves a certain negative aesthetic property and that it therefore qualifies as an object of evaluation in the present sense. When the person in question perceives this fact, he gets a certain negative aesthetic experience of some kind and becomes motivated to rearrange the flowers. 
Moreover, the present account is compatible with the fact that a number of entities which do not have any aesthetic value property might elicit various types of motivating responses. In other words, what elicits a motivating response need not be an object of evaluation. For example, the fact that a person is going to a date might motivate him to dress tastefully. In such cases, however, the response is not related to something which has aesthetic value, an object of evaluation. Consequently, such cases are compatible with the view defended here since this view concerns motivating responses towards objects of evaluation (typically in the form of works of art). 
Furthermore, as regards both these cases it should be recalled that the present account concerns a particular type of motivating responses: a motivation to experience works of art (or some other entities) in order to have a fulfilling sensation of a certain kind. It does not concern other kinds of motivating responses even though they might properly be labelled aesthetic responses. Thus, there is a further reason for maintaining that the present view is compatible with the cases considered above.
(2) Right subject. According to DS1, the person who responds with having the relevant motivating response is an aesthetically ideal observer. That is, it is an aesthetically ideal observer who responds to a work of art which is aesthetically good by having a fulfilling sensation of a certain kind. As a consequence, he is motivated to experience works of art which might give him a similar sensation. Moreover, we are motivated in this manner to the extent we approximate the characteristics of an aesthetically ideal observer. Again, this means that DS1 corresponds to the above account of aesthetic motivation: A person who is aesthetically competent experiences, in his position as observer, an a work of art which is aesthetically good and is motivated to look out for other works which might give him a similar sensation. 
This account is compatible with the possibility that someone who is not an aesthetic observer, but rather a kind of aesthetic agent, has a certain motivating aesthetic response. One example is the person mentioned above who is going to a date and therefore is motivated to dress in an appealing manner. It should be recalled that the view defended here concerns a certain kind of person and a certain kind of motivating response: A person who recognizes that a work of art (or some other entity) is aesthetically good and who is motivated to experience works (or other entities) which might provide him with a similar sensation. Clearly, a person who is motivated in this manner is someone who experiences a work of art (or some other entity), i.e. an aesthetic observer in the relevant sense. Thus, the present claim is compatible with such cases.
(3) Sufficient connection. We observed in section 2 that there appears to be a closer connection between ethical value judgments and motivation than between aesthetic value judgments and motivation. Relatedly, we noticed above that DS1 fails to explain the close connection between ethical value judgments and motivation, but that DS2 at least has a chance to do so. There are presumably a number of factors that are relevant to explain this difference between the two kinds of value judgments, such as the different social function of ethics and aesthetics and the roles they play in our lives. However, it is plausible to argue that the distinction between DS1 and DS2 can contribute to such an explanation. The difference as regards motivation can partly be found in the different relations between, on the one hand, agents and observers and, on the other and what kind of entity they respond to. According to DS2, a moral agent confronts a situation which has certain morally relevant properties which motivates him to perform an action that is morally right. Thus, in the typical ethical case, a person is involved in a situation which is such that it calls for his crucial motivational response in his position as a moral agent: motivation to act. As a consequence, the connection between ethical value judgments and motivation is quite close and a person needs a very good explanation if he does not respond as we expect. According to DS1, an aesthetic observer experiences a work of art which has certain properties, usually aesthetic properties, which make him motivated in the manner described above. Thus, in the typical aesthetic case, a person experiences a work of art which does not in the same manner requires a motivating response from him in his role as an aesthetic observer. The connection is not as close as in the ethical case and we do not in the same manner require an explanation of him if he does not respond as we expect. Consequently, DS1 seems able to explain that the connection between aesthetic value judgments and motivation is as strong as we think it is.    
	Historically, the most important reason for adopting DS1 has probably been the analogy between values and secondary qualities. The standard analysis of colour judgments maintains that an object is, say, red if and only if the object has properties that would elicit a perception of red in a person with normal colour perception in certain conditions (daylight, etc.). Similarly, DS1 maintains that something has a certain value if and only if it has properties which would elicit a certain response in an ideal observer. Although the analogy is made by almost all who embrace analyses of value judgments that are modelled on DS1, the implications this analogy is thought to have varies greatly between different philosophers. Some philosophers who, following John Locke, believe that colours are not real properties of objects, come to the conclusion that we wrongly attribute value properties to objects; we think that objects have these properties, but this is a metaphysical misconception based on the fact that we project our subjective responses onto the world.​[26]​ However, the analogy is more commonly employed by philosophers who believe that colours are real properties of objects. They have seen the analogy as a tool to defend the view that values have a kind of metaphysical objectivity; according to them, values are real properties of objects, just as colours are real properties of objects.​[27]​  
What I have said above implies that this analogy—whatever its consequences in terms of metaphysical objectivity—is mistaken as regards ethical values. The reason is basically the same as why DS1 is unsuitable as a model for analyses of ethical value judgments: It gets the structure of such values wrong since it implies that what is essential with ethics is that we observe actions which we approve or disapprove of, not that we face morally loaded situations which call for action.​[28]​ 
However, it is important to see that the analogy with secondary qualities does seem appropriate as regards aesthetic value. In this case the analogy gets the structure of value judgments right. The analogy implies correctly that what is essential to aesthetics is that we observe works of art which have certain properties—typically aesthetic properties—and that these properties elicit a certain experience in us which, in so far as we are sufficiently aesthetically competent, verifies that the object has a certain aesthetic value.  That aesthetic value judgments are analogous to judgments about secondary qualities is important for the following reason. As we have seen, one attraction of the analogy between secondary qualities and values is the prospect of defending a certain objectivity of the latter: It can be argued, it is thought, that values are as objective as secondary qualities. Now, if aesthetic value judgments can be claimed to have the same structure as judgments about secondary qualities at the same times as they fulfil certain ‘objective’ features, namely (iii) and (iv), there are a least some reason to think that such an argument is viable.

5. CONCLUSION     
In this paper, I have argued that there are important similarities between aesthetic and ethical value judgments since they seem to share four significant features: disagreement, motivation, categoricity, and argumentation. These similarities can be taken to suggest that aesthetic and ethical judgments should be analyzed according to the same dispositional scheme (DS1). However, I have argued that the two kinds of value judgments differ in a fundamental manner: They have entirely different structures. As a consequence, the traditional kind of dispositional analysis which corresponds to the analogy between secondary qualities and values (DS1) is mistaken as regards ethical value judgments, but seems appropriate for their aesthetic counterparts. In order to get the structure of ethical value judgments right, we have to analyze them in accordance with another dispositional scheme (DS2). Since there are reductive as well as non-reductive versions of both these dispositional schemes (DS1 and DS2), they are available to a number of different views about value judgments, including realism.  
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